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428 lines
15 KiB
428 lines
15 KiB
1 year ago
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#if !BESTHTTP_DISABLE_ALTERNATE_SSL && (!UNITY_WEBGL || UNITY_EDITOR)
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#pragma warning disable
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using System;
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using System.IO;
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using BestHTTP.SecureProtocol.Org.BouncyCastle.Crypto.Utilities;
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using BestHTTP.SecureProtocol.Org.BouncyCastle.Utilities;
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namespace BestHTTP.SecureProtocol.Org.BouncyCastle.Tls.Crypto.Impl
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{
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/// <summary>A generic TLS 1.0-1.2 block cipher. This can be used for AES or 3DES for example.</summary>
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public class TlsBlockCipher
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: TlsCipher
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{
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protected readonly TlsCryptoParameters m_cryptoParams;
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protected readonly byte[] m_randomData;
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protected readonly bool m_encryptThenMac;
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protected readonly bool m_useExplicitIV;
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protected readonly bool m_acceptExtraPadding;
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protected readonly bool m_useExtraPadding;
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protected readonly TlsBlockCipherImpl m_decryptCipher, m_encryptCipher;
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protected readonly TlsSuiteMac m_readMac, m_writeMac;
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/// <exception cref="IOException"/>
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public TlsBlockCipher(TlsCryptoParameters cryptoParams, TlsBlockCipherImpl encryptCipher,
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TlsBlockCipherImpl decryptCipher, TlsHmac clientMac, TlsHmac serverMac, int cipherKeySize)
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{
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SecurityParameters securityParameters = cryptoParams.SecurityParameters;
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ProtocolVersion negotiatedVersion = securityParameters.NegotiatedVersion;
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if (TlsImplUtilities.IsTlsV13(negotiatedVersion))
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throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error);
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this.m_cryptoParams = cryptoParams;
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this.m_randomData = cryptoParams.NonceGenerator.GenerateNonce(256);
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this.m_encryptThenMac = securityParameters.IsEncryptThenMac;
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this.m_useExplicitIV = TlsImplUtilities.IsTlsV11(negotiatedVersion);
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this.m_acceptExtraPadding = !negotiatedVersion.IsSsl;
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/*
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* Don't use variable-length padding with truncated MACs.
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*
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* See "Tag Size Does Matter: Attacks and Proofs for the TLS Record Protocol", Paterson,
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* Ristenpart, Shrimpton.
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*
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* TODO[DTLS] Consider supporting in DTLS (without exceeding send limit though)
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*/
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this.m_useExtraPadding = securityParameters.IsExtendedPadding
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&& ProtocolVersion.TLSv10.IsEqualOrEarlierVersionOf(negotiatedVersion)
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&& (m_encryptThenMac || !securityParameters.IsTruncatedHmac);
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this.m_encryptCipher = encryptCipher;
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this.m_decryptCipher = decryptCipher;
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TlsBlockCipherImpl clientCipher, serverCipher;
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if (cryptoParams.IsServer)
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{
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clientCipher = decryptCipher;
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serverCipher = encryptCipher;
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}
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else
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{
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clientCipher = encryptCipher;
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serverCipher = decryptCipher;
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}
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int key_block_size = (2 * cipherKeySize) + clientMac.MacLength + serverMac.MacLength;
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// From TLS 1.1 onwards, block ciphers don't need IVs from the key_block
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if (!m_useExplicitIV)
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{
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key_block_size += clientCipher.GetBlockSize() + serverCipher.GetBlockSize();
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}
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byte[] key_block = TlsImplUtilities.CalculateKeyBlock(cryptoParams, key_block_size);
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int offset = 0;
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clientMac.SetKey(key_block, offset, clientMac.MacLength);
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offset += clientMac.MacLength;
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serverMac.SetKey(key_block, offset, serverMac.MacLength);
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offset += serverMac.MacLength;
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clientCipher.SetKey(key_block, offset, cipherKeySize);
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offset += cipherKeySize;
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serverCipher.SetKey(key_block, offset, cipherKeySize);
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offset += cipherKeySize;
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int clientIVLength = clientCipher.GetBlockSize();
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int serverIVLength = serverCipher.GetBlockSize();
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if (m_useExplicitIV)
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{
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clientCipher.Init(new byte[clientIVLength], 0, clientIVLength);
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serverCipher.Init(new byte[serverIVLength], 0, serverIVLength);
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}
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else
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{
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clientCipher.Init(key_block, offset, clientIVLength);
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offset += clientIVLength;
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serverCipher.Init(key_block, offset, serverIVLength);
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offset += serverIVLength;
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}
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if (offset != key_block_size)
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throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error);
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if (cryptoParams.IsServer)
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{
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this.m_writeMac = new TlsSuiteHmac(cryptoParams, serverMac);
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this.m_readMac = new TlsSuiteHmac(cryptoParams, clientMac);
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}
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else
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{
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this.m_writeMac = new TlsSuiteHmac(cryptoParams, clientMac);
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this.m_readMac = new TlsSuiteHmac(cryptoParams, serverMac);
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}
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}
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public virtual int GetCiphertextDecodeLimit(int plaintextLimit)
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{
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int blockSize = m_decryptCipher.GetBlockSize();
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int macSize = m_readMac.Size;
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int maxPadding = 256;
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return GetCiphertextLength(blockSize, macSize, maxPadding, plaintextLimit);
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}
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public virtual int GetCiphertextEncodeLimit(int plaintextLength, int plaintextLimit)
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{
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int blockSize = m_encryptCipher.GetBlockSize();
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int macSize = m_writeMac.Size;
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int maxPadding = m_useExtraPadding ? 256 : blockSize;
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return GetCiphertextLength(blockSize, macSize, maxPadding, plaintextLength);
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}
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public virtual int GetPlaintextLimit(int ciphertextLimit)
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{
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int blockSize = m_encryptCipher.GetBlockSize();
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int macSize = m_writeMac.Size;
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int plaintextLimit = ciphertextLimit;
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// Leave room for the MAC, and require block-alignment
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if (m_encryptThenMac)
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{
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plaintextLimit -= macSize;
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plaintextLimit -= plaintextLimit % blockSize;
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}
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else
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{
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plaintextLimit -= plaintextLimit % blockSize;
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plaintextLimit -= macSize;
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}
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// Minimum 1 byte of padding
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--plaintextLimit;
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// An explicit IV consumes 1 block
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if (m_useExplicitIV)
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{
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plaintextLimit -= blockSize;
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}
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return plaintextLimit;
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}
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public virtual TlsEncodeResult EncodePlaintext(long seqNo, short contentType, ProtocolVersion recordVersion,
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int headerAllocation, byte[] plaintext, int offset, int len)
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{
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int blockSize = m_encryptCipher.GetBlockSize();
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int macSize = m_writeMac.Size;
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int enc_input_length = len;
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if (!m_encryptThenMac)
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{
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enc_input_length += macSize;
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}
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int padding_length = blockSize - (enc_input_length % blockSize);
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if (m_useExtraPadding)
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{
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// Add a random number of extra blocks worth of padding
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int maxExtraPadBlocks = (256 - padding_length) / blockSize;
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int actualExtraPadBlocks = ChooseExtraPadBlocks(maxExtraPadBlocks);
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padding_length += actualExtraPadBlocks * blockSize;
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}
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int totalSize = len + macSize + padding_length;
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if (m_useExplicitIV)
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{
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totalSize += blockSize;
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}
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byte[] outBuf = new byte[headerAllocation + totalSize];
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int outOff = headerAllocation;
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if (m_useExplicitIV)
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{
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// Technically the explicit IV will be the encryption of this nonce
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byte[] explicitIV = m_cryptoParams.NonceGenerator.GenerateNonce(blockSize);
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Array.Copy(explicitIV, 0, outBuf, outOff, blockSize);
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outOff += blockSize;
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}
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Array.Copy(plaintext, offset, outBuf, outOff, len);
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outOff += len;
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if (!m_encryptThenMac)
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{
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byte[] mac = m_writeMac.CalculateMac(seqNo, contentType, plaintext, offset, len);
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Array.Copy(mac, 0, outBuf, outOff, mac.Length);
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outOff += mac.Length;
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}
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byte padByte = (byte)(padding_length - 1);
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for (int i = 0; i < padding_length; ++i)
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{
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outBuf[outOff++] = padByte;
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}
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m_encryptCipher.DoFinal(outBuf, headerAllocation, outOff - headerAllocation, outBuf, headerAllocation);
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if (m_encryptThenMac)
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{
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byte[] mac = m_writeMac.CalculateMac(seqNo, contentType, outBuf, headerAllocation,
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outOff - headerAllocation);
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Array.Copy(mac, 0, outBuf, outOff, mac.Length);
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outOff += mac.Length;
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}
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if (outOff != outBuf.Length)
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throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error);
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return new TlsEncodeResult(outBuf, 0, outBuf.Length, contentType);
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}
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public virtual TlsDecodeResult DecodeCiphertext(long seqNo, short recordType, ProtocolVersion recordVersion,
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byte[] ciphertext, int offset, int len)
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{
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int blockSize = m_decryptCipher.GetBlockSize();
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int macSize = m_readMac.Size;
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int minLen = blockSize;
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if (m_encryptThenMac)
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{
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minLen += macSize;
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}
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else
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{
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minLen = System.Math.Max(minLen, macSize + 1);
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}
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if (m_useExplicitIV)
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{
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minLen += blockSize;
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}
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if (len < minLen)
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throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.decode_error);
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int blocks_length = len;
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if (m_encryptThenMac)
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{
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blocks_length -= macSize;
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}
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if (blocks_length % blockSize != 0)
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throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.decryption_failed);
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if (m_encryptThenMac)
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{
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byte[] expectedMac = m_readMac.CalculateMac(seqNo, recordType, ciphertext, offset, len - macSize);
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bool checkMac = TlsUtilities.ConstantTimeAreEqual(macSize, expectedMac, 0, ciphertext,
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offset + len - macSize);
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if (!checkMac)
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{
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/*
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* RFC 7366 3. The MAC SHALL be evaluated before any further processing such as
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* decryption is performed, and if the MAC verification fails, then processing SHALL
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* terminate immediately. For TLS, a fatal bad_record_mac MUST be generated [2]. For
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* DTLS, the record MUST be discarded, and a fatal bad_record_mac MAY be generated
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* [4]. This immediate response to a bad MAC eliminates any timing channels that may
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* be available through the use of manipulated packet data.
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*/
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throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.bad_record_mac);
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}
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}
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m_decryptCipher.DoFinal(ciphertext, offset, blocks_length, ciphertext, offset);
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if (m_useExplicitIV)
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{
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offset += blockSize;
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blocks_length -= blockSize;
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}
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// If there's anything wrong with the padding, this will return zero
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int totalPad = CheckPaddingConstantTime(ciphertext, offset, blocks_length, blockSize,
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m_encryptThenMac ? 0 : macSize);
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bool badMac = (totalPad == 0);
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int dec_output_length = blocks_length - totalPad;
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if (!m_encryptThenMac)
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{
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dec_output_length -= macSize;
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byte[] expectedMac = m_readMac.CalculateMacConstantTime(seqNo, recordType, ciphertext, offset,
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dec_output_length, blocks_length - macSize, m_randomData);
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badMac |= !TlsUtilities.ConstantTimeAreEqual(macSize, expectedMac, 0, ciphertext,
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offset + dec_output_length);
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}
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if (badMac)
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throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.bad_record_mac);
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return new TlsDecodeResult(ciphertext, offset, dec_output_length, recordType);
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}
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public virtual void RekeyDecoder()
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{
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throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error);
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}
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public virtual void RekeyEncoder()
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{
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throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error);
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}
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public virtual bool UsesOpaqueRecordType
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{
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get { return false; }
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}
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protected virtual int CheckPaddingConstantTime(byte[] buf, int off, int len, int blockSize, int macSize)
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{
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int end = off + len;
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byte lastByte = buf[end - 1];
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int padlen = lastByte & 0xff;
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int totalPad = padlen + 1;
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int dummyIndex = 0;
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byte padDiff = 0;
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int totalPadLimit = System.Math.Min(m_acceptExtraPadding ? 256 : blockSize, len - macSize);
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if (totalPad > totalPadLimit)
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{
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totalPad = 0;
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}
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else
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{
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int padPos = end - totalPad;
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do
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{
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padDiff |= (byte)(buf[padPos++] ^ lastByte);
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}
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while (padPos < end);
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dummyIndex = totalPad;
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if (padDiff != 0)
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{
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totalPad = 0;
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}
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}
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// Run some extra dummy checks so the number of checks is always constant
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{
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byte[] dummyPad = m_randomData;
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while (dummyIndex < 256)
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{
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padDiff |= (byte)(dummyPad[dummyIndex++] ^ lastByte);
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}
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// Ensure the above loop is not eliminated
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dummyPad[0] ^= padDiff;
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}
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return totalPad;
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}
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protected virtual int ChooseExtraPadBlocks(int max)
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{
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byte[] random = m_cryptoParams.NonceGenerator.GenerateNonce(4);
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int x = (int)Pack.LE_To_UInt32(random, 0);
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int n = Integers.NumberOfTrailingZeros(x);
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return System.Math.Min(n, max);
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}
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protected virtual int GetCiphertextLength(int blockSize, int macSize, int maxPadding, int plaintextLength)
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{
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int ciphertextLength = plaintextLength;
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// An explicit IV consumes 1 block
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if (m_useExplicitIV)
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{
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ciphertextLength += blockSize;
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}
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// Leave room for the MAC and (block-aligning) padding
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ciphertextLength += maxPadding;
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if (m_encryptThenMac)
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{
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ciphertextLength -= (ciphertextLength % blockSize);
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ciphertextLength += macSize;
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}
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else
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{
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ciphertextLength += macSize;
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ciphertextLength -= (ciphertextLength % blockSize);
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}
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return ciphertextLength;
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}
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}
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}
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#pragma warning restore
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#endif
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