#if !BESTHTTP_DISABLE_ALTERNATE_SSL && (!UNITY_WEBGL || UNITY_EDITOR) #pragma warning disable using System; using System.IO; using System.Text; using BestHTTP.SecureProtocol.Org.BouncyCastle.Asn1; using BestHTTP.SecureProtocol.Org.BouncyCastle.Asn1.X509; using BestHTTP.SecureProtocol.Org.BouncyCastle.Crypto; using BestHTTP.SecureProtocol.Org.BouncyCastle.Utilities; using BestHTTP.SecureProtocol.Org.BouncyCastle.X509; namespace BestHTTP.SecureProtocol.Org.BouncyCastle.Pkix { /// /// A trust anchor or most-trusted Certification Authority (CA). /// /// This class represents a "most-trusted CA", which is used as a trust anchor /// for validating X.509 certification paths. A most-trusted CA includes the /// public key of the CA, the CA's name, and any constraints upon the set of /// paths which may be validated using this key. These parameters can be /// specified in the form of a trusted X509Certificate or as individual /// parameters. /// public class TrustAnchor { private readonly AsymmetricKeyParameter pubKey; private readonly string caName; private readonly X509Name caPrincipal; private readonly X509Certificate trustedCert; private byte[] ncBytes; private NameConstraints nc; /// /// Creates an instance of TrustAnchor with the specified X509Certificate and /// optional name constraints, which are intended to be used as additional /// constraints when validating an X.509 certification path. /// The name constraints are specified as a byte array. This byte array /// should contain the DER encoded form of the name constraints, as they /// would appear in the NameConstraints structure defined in RFC 2459 and /// X.509. The ASN.1 definition of this structure appears below. /// ///
	    ///	NameConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
	    ///		permittedSubtrees       [0]     GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL,
	    ///		excludedSubtrees        [1]     GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL }
	    ///	   
        /// GeneralSubtrees ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralSubtree
        /// 
        ///		GeneralSubtree ::= SEQUENCE {
        ///		base                    GeneralName,
        ///		minimum         [0]     BaseDistance DEFAULT 0,
        ///		maximum         [1]     BaseDistance OPTIONAL }
        ///		
        ///		BaseDistance ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)
		///
		///		GeneralName ::= CHOICE {
		///		otherName                       [0]     OtherName,
		///		rfc822Name                      [1]     IA5String,
		///		dNSName                         [2]     IA5String,
		///		x400Address                     [3]     ORAddress,
		///		directoryName                   [4]     Name,
		///		ediPartyName                    [5]     EDIPartyName,
		///		uniformResourceIdentifier       [6]     IA5String,
		///		iPAddress                       [7]     OCTET STRING,
		///		registeredID                    [8]     OBJECT IDENTIFIER}
		///	
/// /// Note that the name constraints byte array supplied is cloned to protect /// against subsequent modifications. ///
/// a trusted X509Certificate /// a byte array containing the ASN.1 DER encoding of a /// NameConstraints extension to be used for checking name /// constraints. Only the value of the extension is included, not /// the OID or criticality flag. Specify null to omit the /// parameter. /// if the specified X509Certificate is null public TrustAnchor( X509Certificate trustedCert, byte[] nameConstraints) { if (trustedCert == null) throw new ArgumentNullException("trustedCert"); this.trustedCert = trustedCert; this.pubKey = null; this.caName = null; this.caPrincipal = null; setNameConstraints(nameConstraints); } /// /// Creates an instance of TrustAnchor where the /// most-trusted CA is specified as an X500Principal and public key. /// /// ///

/// Name constraints are an optional parameter, and are intended to be used /// as additional constraints when validating an X.509 certification path. ///

/// The name constraints are specified as a byte array. This byte array /// contains the DER encoded form of the name constraints, as they /// would appear in the NameConstraints structure defined in RFC 2459 /// and X.509. The ASN.1 notation for this structure is supplied in the /// documentation for the other constructors. ///

/// Note that the name constraints byte array supplied here is cloned to /// protect against subsequent modifications. ///

///
/// the name of the most-trusted CA as X509Name /// the public key of the most-trusted CA /// /// a byte array containing the ASN.1 DER encoding of a NameConstraints extension to /// be used for checking name constraints. Only the value of the extension is included, /// not the OID or criticality flag. Specify null to omit the parameter. /// /// /// if caPrincipal or pubKey is null /// public TrustAnchor( X509Name caPrincipal, AsymmetricKeyParameter pubKey, byte[] nameConstraints) { if (caPrincipal == null) throw new ArgumentNullException("caPrincipal"); if (pubKey == null) throw new ArgumentNullException("pubKey"); this.trustedCert = null; this.caPrincipal = caPrincipal; this.caName = caPrincipal.ToString(); this.pubKey = pubKey; setNameConstraints(nameConstraints); } /// /// Creates an instance of TrustAnchor where the most-trusted /// CA is specified as a distinguished name and public key. Name constraints /// are an optional parameter, and are intended to be used as additional /// constraints when validating an X.509 certification path. ///
/// The name constraints are specified as a byte array. This byte array /// contains the DER encoded form of the name constraints, as they would /// appear in the NameConstraints structure defined in RFC 2459 and X.509. ///
/// the X.500 distinguished name of the most-trusted CA in RFC /// 2253 string format /// the public key of the most-trusted CA /// a byte array containing the ASN.1 DER encoding of a /// NameConstraints extension to be used for checking name /// constraints. Only the value of the extension is included, not /// the OID or criticality flag. Specify null to omit the /// parameter. /// throws NullPointerException, IllegalArgumentException public TrustAnchor( string caName, AsymmetricKeyParameter pubKey, byte[] nameConstraints) { if (caName == null) throw new ArgumentNullException("caName"); if (pubKey == null) throw new ArgumentNullException("pubKey"); if (caName.Length == 0) throw new ArgumentException("caName can not be an empty string"); this.caPrincipal = new X509Name(caName); this.pubKey = pubKey; this.caName = caName; this.trustedCert = null; setNameConstraints(nameConstraints); } /// /// Returns the most-trusted CA certificate. /// public X509Certificate TrustedCert { get { return this.trustedCert; } } /// /// Returns the name of the most-trusted CA as an X509Name. /// public X509Name CA { get { return this.caPrincipal; } } /// /// Returns the name of the most-trusted CA in RFC 2253 string format. /// public string CAName { get { return this.caName; } } /// /// Returns the public key of the most-trusted CA. /// public AsymmetricKeyParameter CAPublicKey { get { return this.pubKey; } } /// /// Decode the name constraints and clone them if not null. /// private void setNameConstraints( byte[] bytes) { if (bytes == null) { ncBytes = null; nc = null; } else { ncBytes = (byte[]) bytes.Clone(); // validate DER encoding //nc = new NameConstraintsExtension(Boolean.FALSE, bytes); nc = NameConstraints.GetInstance(Asn1Object.FromByteArray(bytes)); } } public byte[] GetNameConstraints { get { return Arrays.Clone(ncBytes); } } /// /// Returns a formatted string describing the TrustAnchor. /// /// a formatted string describing the TrustAnchor public override string ToString() { // TODO Some of the sub-objects might not implement ToString() properly string nl = BestHTTP.SecureProtocol.Org.BouncyCastle.Utilities.Platform.NewLine; StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); sb.Append("["); sb.Append(nl); if (this.pubKey != null) { sb.Append(" Trusted CA Public Key: ").Append(this.pubKey).Append(nl); sb.Append(" Trusted CA Issuer Name: ").Append(this.caName).Append(nl); } else { sb.Append(" Trusted CA cert: ").Append(this.TrustedCert).Append(nl); } if (nc != null) { sb.Append(" Name Constraints: ").Append(nc).Append(nl); } return sb.ToString(); } } } #pragma warning restore #endif